This chapter discusses the deployment of the countermeasures that includes an overview of each countermeasure along with any problems that needed to be addressed in the installation process. Also presented is a comparison of the countermeasures in terms of cost and device availability. A description of each individual countermeasure, its purpose, the setting for each Miami-Dade installation, and approval status, and relative cost information, are presented in Chapter 3.

2.1 OVERVIEW OF INSTALLATION CHALLENGES

Phase II involved the installation and evaluation of a broad range of pedestrian safety measures, from nearly routine signal timing changes to customized video detection equipment.

However, there were several common challenges that the Miami-Dade team faced:

• Selection and Confirmation of Countermeasures: The initial process of selecting countermeasures and assigning them to specific locations was described in the Phase I Final Report and the Phase II Implementation Plan and Preliminary Engineering Report. This involved development of a comprehensive list of candidate countermeasures, which were then rated on several criteria, such as match to the crash type, cost, presumed efficacy, and ease of implementation. These were matched to each location by meticulous analysis of the type of crash, causal factors and the physical characteristics of the roadway. For example, if vehicles turning right on red injured a number of pedestrians at a particular location, a static NRTOR sign and an electronic NRTOR sign were considered. Because a “NO TURN ON RED WHEN PEDESTRIANS ARE PRESENT” sign was already present we decided to compare the standard “NO RIGHT TURN ON RED” sign with the electronic NRTOR sign. We also placed a premium on low cost items that could be installed in large numbers to increase the chance of producing a sufficiently large reduction in crashes to be detected.

• Scheduling of Countermeasures: We attempted to install countermeasures in a staged manner (multiple baseline design) in order to control for extraneous variables. Although we were usually successful in following the dictates of the selected design protocol, there were times when treatments would not be introduced or removed according to our schedule because of conflicting priorities of the Contractor or Miami-Dade staff. In these instances, we often needed to collect fresh baseline data to allow for a valid comparison. This problem arose often and contributed to the increased cost of the research component of this project.

• Extreme Weather Events: Two major hurricanes struck Miami-Dade during the critical period when countermeasures were being installed and evaluated. These storms destroyed the video recording systems, forcing the team to employ field observation. One implication of this change was the need to reduce the number of items recorded in order to ensure the collection of reliably data. The storms also destroyed some countermeasure, which had to be reinstalled. These storms added additional cost to the project.

2.2 COMPARISON OF COUNTERMEASURES: EASE OF IMPLEMENTATION

Three countermeasures proved more challenging to deploy:

• The Electronic NRTOR sign;

• The Video Pedestrian Detector;

• In Street Yield to Pedestrian signs; and

The first listed two devices involved procurement or deployment of electronic equipment that engineering staff and electricians were not highly familiar with. The remaining device was easily deployed but would not stay deployed due to frequent collisions with vehicles.

The manufacturer installed the Rectangular LED Rapid Flashing Beacons greatly reducing the scope for installation problems with this relatively new technology.

2.3 COMPARISON OF COUNTERMEASURES: COSTS

The overall cost of this project was slightly greater than 1 million dollars, including $870,540 in federal funding, $140,000 in state funding, and $186,771 in county funding. The federal funding averaged roughly $ 217,635 per year.

The total costs of the nearly seven-year-long project included the following rough estimates:

In general, the labor costs far exceeded the equipment and materials costs. Overall, the engineering/administrative costs were quite substantial, largely due to the need for specialized training, mobilization, and approvals for new devices. These engineering/administrative costs often exceeded the material/equipment costs and the installation labor.

The least expensive countermeasures in total per-unit costs were Pedestrian Warning Signs. The most expensive countermeasure was the Video Detection System.

If this project is replicated by a community with a strict focus on improving pedestrian safety with know treatments in a cost-effective manner, the data collection/evaluation and other program management costs could be substantially lower than the costs of the present study. Cost estimates are provided for each item in Chapter 3. Table 2.1 shows an estimate of capital costs and labor plus engineering costs for each countermeasure.

In general, the labor and engineering costs often exceeded the materials/equipment costs. As is often the case the engineering/administrative costs for products used for the first time, tend to be higher than for equipment that are routinely installed. As staff becomes more familiar with new technology there is a major savings in time and effort. Additionally, installation cost were high because only a few devices could be installed at a time, rather than installing all devices in one operation.

2.4 COMPARISON OF COUNTERMEASURES: AVAILABILITY AND STANDARD USE

All but two countermeasures were compliant with the Federal Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). It was necessary to obtain special approval to experiment with the rectangular LED rapid flashing beacon and the “Turning Vehicles Yield to Pedestrians” symbol signs. Several countermeasures considered experimental when initially proposed by the Miami-Dade team were added to the MUTCD in the 2003 revision. One other countermeasure requiring approval (in street pedestrian turning vehicle yield signs at signalized intersections) was removed after engineering studies revealed there was insufficient room to install these signs at the Miami Beach intersections originally selected for evaluation.